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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

CHRISTOPHER NEAL OSBORN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 47852-2020
KOOTENAI COUNTY
NO. CR-2017-11559
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christopher Neal Osborn appeals from the order denying his motion for reduction of
sentence, made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b ). He argues that, in light of the additional
information presented with his motion, his sentence is excessive and the district court's refusal to
grant a reduction was unreasonable, representing an abuse of discretion.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's threshold claim that the district court
lost jurisdiction "due to the passage of time" to consider and rule upon Mr. Osborne's timelyfiled Rule 35, and to demonstrate that contrary to the State's assertion, the district court had
jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Osborne's motion.
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The State's argument on the merits of the appeal is unremarkable and Mr. Osborn
respectfully refers this Court to the argument in his Appellant's Brief as his argument in reply.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Osborn's Criminal Rule 35 Motion
For Reduction Of Sentence?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Osborn's Criminal Rule 35 Motion
For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Osborne argues the district court's order denying his

Criminal Rule 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence should be reversed because the district
court abused its discretion.

(Appellant's Br., p.1.)

He asserts that additional information

Mr. Osborn presented to the district court demonstrates that his sentence of five years, with four
years fixed, is excessively harsh.
The State claims that the order denying Mr. Osborn's Rule 35 motion "should be
affirmed because the district court lost jurisdiction, due to the passage of time, to grant the
motion." (Resp. Br., p.4.) The State correctly observes that under this Court's precedent, a trial
court has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 motion within a "reasonable time" after the deadline
for filing the motion, and that in this case the court ruled on Mr. Osborne's motion 124 days after
the filing deadline.

(Resp. Br., p.3.) However, the State does claim that 124 days was an

unreasonable amount of time. (See generally Resp.Br.) Rather, the State argues that "[b ]ecuase
nothing in the record shows a reason for the delay, the court had no jurisdiction."
(Resp. Br., p.4.) The State is incorrect and its argument should be rejected.
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First, the State relies on State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351 (1992), and the Court of
Appeals' statement in State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 240-41 (Ct. App.2004). (Resp.Br., p.3).
However, both cases are distinguishable.

In Chapman, the defendant timely filed a Rule 35

motion, but the district court did not deny the motion until approximately twenty-nine months
later. Chapman, 121 Idaho at 351. Then, approximately three months after denying the motion,
the district court on reconsideration granted the motion. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed.
It held that "a district court does not lose jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion

under Rule merely because the 120-day period [within which a Rule 35 motion must be filed]
expires before the judge reasonably can consider and act upon the motion." Id. at 354. The Court
concluded, however, that "if the trial court does not rule upon the Rule 35 motion within a
reasonable time after expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses jurisdiction." Id.
Further, the Court concluded that "when a district judge delays action on a Rule 35(b) motion till
[sic] long after the expiration of 120 days, for the purpose or with the likely effect of assuming
the function of the parole authorities, his delay is unreasonable." Id. at 356.
In Diggie, the Court of Appeals stated that,
jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 motion exists for a reasonable period of time.
Unreasonable delay causes the district court to lose jurisdiction. The time limit in
Rule 35 is a limit on the period in which a defendant may file his motion. It is not
an express limitation on jurisdiction.
140 Idaho at 240-41 (emphasis added).
The State does not claim there was an "unreasonable delay" in Mr. Osborn's case or that
the court took an "unreasonable period of time" to rule on the motion.

(See generally

Resp. Br. p.3.)
While it is true that the district court decided the motion after the 14-day filing period had
expired, the period of time was neither ''unreasonable" nor constituted a "delay." As stated by
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the Court of Appeals, the time limit provided in Rule 35 "is a limit on the period in which a
defendant may file his motion." Diggie, 140 Idaho at 241. "It is not an express limitation on
jurisdiction." Id. As stated in Chapman, the trial court loses jurisdiction to consider a Rule 35
motion only if the court does not rule "within a reasonable time after" the filing deadline. 121
Idaho at 351.
Contrary to the State's characterization (Resp. Br., p.3-4), the period of time that follows
the filing deadline is not a "delay" within the meaning of Chapman or Diggie. The motion was
timely filed and timely noticed for hearing, and the period of time up to the initially-scheduled
December 31, 2019 hearing date cannot properly be characterized as "delay."
Moreover, and contrary to the State's assertions, (Resp. Br., pp.3-4), the fact that the
hearing was continued to February 26, and heard and decided on that date does not show that the
decision on the motion was unreasonably delayed. The State focuses on the fact that the original
hearing date was continued and the district court record does not disclose the reason for that
continuance. (Resp. Br., pp.3-4.) Absent an affirmative showing that the continuance was for an
improper purpose, an appropriate reason to continue is presumed. State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55,
61 (2015) (applying presumption of regularity to Rule 35 motions). Thus, the fact of the single
continuance, timely sought, does mean that the court did not decide the motion "within a
reasonable time."
Additionally, and while not binding or authoritative, 1 Mr. Osborn notes that the Court of
Appeals rejected a similar argument made by the State in State v. Roche, 2019 WL 1934896,
(Appeal No.46159, filed April 30, 2019). In Roche, the Rule 35 motion was filed two days
before the filing deadline and the district court granted partial relief on the motion more than five
1

The unpublished opinion is neither precedent nor binding on any court. Mr. Osborn does not
cite the opinion as authority to this Court, but for informational purposes only.
4

months later. Id. at 2. On appeal, the State asserted the district court's ruling was untimely and
that the court lost jurisdiction. Id.

In rejecting the State's assertion, the Court of Appeals

explained,
the record shows that the motion's resolution was modestly delayed for purposes
of allowing Roche to attend the hearing on the motion and then to submit
supporting information. Under the circumstances, the delays were reasonable.
Further, there is no indication that the district court's ruling encroached upon the
parole commission's authority.
Id.

In the present case, the record shows Mr. Osborn timely filed his motion on October 11,
and filed supporting materials on October 15 and November 1. (R., pp.14, 122; PSI, pp.119-124.)
Mr. Osborn then diligently pursued a ruling on his motion: he noticed-up his motion for hearing,
and obtained a court order to participate telephonically at that hearing, which the court originally
set for December 31, 2019. (See R., pp.14, 138.) Though the record does not disclose the reason
for the continuance of the December 31 hearing date - a date close to and between two nonjudicial days see Idaho Administrative Rule 44(a) - the record does show that on January 2,
Mr. Osborn filed additional information (R., p.14; PSI, pp.124-30); on January 14, Mr. Osborne
filed a Notice of Hearing to have his motion heard on February 26, 2020; that he subsequently
filed a motion and obtained an order for his telephonic appearance at his hearing; and that the
hearing was held as scheduled on February 26, and the district court decided the motion that
same day. (R., pp.14, 144, 146; Tr., p.6, Ls.9-13.)
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reject the State's assertion that the district court
lost jurisdiction "due to the passage of time."
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in his Appellant's Brief and those herein, Mr. Osborn
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion, and
to reduce the fixed portion of his sentence to two years.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2020.

/ s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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